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This paper studies the role of training vouchers and caseworkers in public training programs. 
Using a rich administrative data set, we apply matching and regression methods to measure 
the effect of the Hartz reform in Germany, which introduced training vouchers and imposed 
more selective criteria on participants. Besides estimating the overall reform effect, we isolate 
the effect induced by changes in the composition of program participants due to stricter 
selection by the caseworkers (selection effect) from the effect based on the introduction of 
vouchers (voucher effect). Analyzing the most important type of training in Germany, we find 
a slightly positive impact of the reform. Our decomposition results suggest that the selection 
effect is − if at all − slightly negative, and that the voucher effect increased both, the 
employment probability and earnings of the participants. 
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Germany reformed its active labor market policy (ALMP) in a series of reforms
which are commonly known as the Hartz reforms. When the ﬁrst wave of these
reforms (Hartz I/II) came into force on January 1, 2003 the provision of public
training programs was substantially changed. The most important change was the
introduction of a voucher scheme. The former contracting-out system was aban-
doned and replaced by a system in which job seekers are free to select their training
provider in the market. Previously this choice was made by the caseworker. How-
ever, the participants are not completely free in their choice, because the content of
the training is still assigned by the caseworker. Vouchers are a common instrument
in other ﬁelds of public services, but this approach is rather novel in the context
of delivering ALMP. In addition to the voucher scheme, a stricter selection of the
participants by the caseworkers was introduced.
This reform provides us a valuable opportunity to study not only the overall
training impact, which is the main parameter of interest in most of the literature on
training, but also to investigate the eﬀect of diﬀerent components inside the training
“black box”. In this paper, we estimate the impact of the reform on the eﬀectiveness
of the most important training program type for the unemployed in Germany. We
disentangle the eﬀect induced by the introduction of vouchers (voucher eﬀect) from
the eﬀect induced by a stricter selection by the caseworkers (selection eﬀect).
Increased consumer choice and provider competition are the main arguments
in favor of the introduction of vouchers (see, e.g., Steuerle, 2000). It is argued that
the possibility to choose the training provider in accordance to their preferences will
lead to better matches between the unemployed and training providers, which will
increase the eﬀectiveness of participation. In addition to that, greater freedom of
choice may encourage more competition among the providers. Training providers
may have to compete more if they must regularly face the demand of participants
instead of having a longer-term contract with the employment agency. This could
lead to a further increase of the match quality and therewith of the eﬀectiveness
of training programs. On the other hand, there may be obstacles in case of pub-
lic training programs which counteract the potential positive impacts of vouchers.
Generally, it is argued that the consumer—in our case the unemployed—may lack
competence or resources to optimally choose, and that information asymmetries
may lead to choices which do not truly reﬂect consumers’ preferences. For example,
the caseworkers may know more about the availability of training courses and the
1quality of training providers than the unemployed, because of their experience with
previous participants. For a discussion of advantages and disadvantages of training
vouchers see Barnow (2000, 2008).
Vouchers have been widely used in other ﬁelds of public services—in particular
in the ﬁeld of education—and are quite extensively studied in the literature.1 There
exist some studies on vouchers for pre-school education (e.g., Viitanen, 2007), but
most studies focus on school education (e.g., Manski, 1992; Nechyba, 2000; Angrist
et al., 2002; Krueger and Zhu, 2004). Ladd (2002) presents a review of major studies
on school vouchers. She concludes that the overall picture that can be drawn from
these studies is rather inconclusive, and that the results are not very robust. For
instance, studies with U.S. data typically indicate to have insuﬃcient information
to draw clear conclusions about the net eﬀects on student achievement or social and
racial segregation. What can be learned—e.g., from large-scale programs in Chile or
New Zealand—seems to be that large-scale universal school voucher programs do not
generate substantial gains and could even be detrimental to sub-populations. More
narrowly targeted programs seem to be more promising, but should be carefully
implemented and only serve as one element of a broader strategy.
While school vouchers are quite extensively studied in the literature, there
exist only few studies of vouchers for job training programs. Barnow (2008) gives
an overview of studies on vouchers in U.S. vocational training programs. The em-
pirical evidence for the eﬀectiveness of training vouchers for dislocated workers is
mixed. To the best of our knowledge there exist no econometric study evaluating
the eﬀectiveness of the introduction of vouchers for training programs targeted at
unemployed individuals.2
In this paper we focus on a voucher for training programs in the context of
ALMP, and estimate the impact of the introduction of training vouchers on the
eﬀectiveness of the most important program type in Germany: occupation-related
or general training. Participants in this program either learn speciﬁc skills required
for a certain vocation or receive qualiﬁcations which are of general vocational use.
In the pre-reform period about 60 percent of all unemployed participants in public
training programs were assigned to this particular type, and it became even more
1The discussion about vouchers in the educational context started with Friedman (1962).
2A recent example for vouchers in the context of ALMP—although not in the ﬁeld of education—
is the job placement voucher. It was introduced in Germany in 2002 in order to end the public
placement monopoly and subsidize private competitors. Winterhager et al. (2006) evaluate the
eﬀectiveness of this instrument and ﬁnd a positive impact on the employment probability of voucher
recipients in West Germany.
2important after the reform in 2003 as this share increased to more than 70 percent.
In addition to the training voucher, a stricter selection of participants and
program types by the caseworkers based on the expected reemployment probability
was introduced. This implies that the caseworkers tend to select individuals with
higher reemployment probabilities for participation—independent of the individual
gain resulting from participation. Thus, the overall eﬀect of the reform could result
from the introduction of the voucher system (voucher eﬀect) and from a change in the
composition of participants (selection eﬀect). To decompose the overall reform eﬀect
into these two eﬀects, we apply a two-step propensity score matching procedure using
a rich administrative data set. This approach allows a comparison between pre- and
post-reform participants who have similar observable characteristics. Furthermore,
we apply regression analyses to the matched data to adjust for possible remaining
unbalanced covariates, and to take into account changes in the general economic
conditions.
We ﬁnd a slightly positive impact of the reform. The decomposition of this
overall eﬀect shows that the selection eﬀect is—if at all—slightly negative. This
ﬁnding is consistent with Lechner and Smith (2007). Although the selection eﬀect
in our paper diﬀers from the eﬀect of caseworkers in their paper, the major part of
our selection eﬀect is also due to the caseworker. Our ﬁndings imply that using post-
training outcomes as a performance standard is not a good strategy to improve the
eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of public training programs, see Heckman et al. (1997)
for an insightful discussion on performance standards in the context of the Job
Training Partnership Act. Furthermore, we ﬁnd evidence that the voucher eﬀect
increased both, the employment probability and earnings of the participants. This
eﬀect becomes substantially positive after around 6 months of training, and decreases
slightly at the end of our observation period (1.5 years after program entry).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
institutional background of public training programs in Germany with a particular
focus on changes between the pre- and post-reform period. After describing the
analytical framework in Section 3 and the data in Section 4, we discuss the matching
quality in Section 5 and present the results in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
32 Institutional Background
ALMP aims to increase the employment prospects of unemployed individuals. For
this purpose, the Federal Employment Agency (FEA) in Germany spends a sub-
stantial amount of money on programs such as job creation schemes, public training
programs, or employment subsidies. For instance, about 20.5 billion Euros were
spent in 2002 (Eichhorst and Zimmermann, 2007). The most important part of
ALMP in Germany are public training programs. With almost 7 billion Euros,
these programs account for more than 32 percent of the expenditures. However, the
number of participants decreased over the last years (see Figure 1). While more
than 500,000 unemployed individuals entered a training program in 2000, this num-
ber approached only around 130,000 individuals in 2005. In 2006, it increased again
to nearly 250,000 persons entering such programs.
Figure 1 about here
The eﬀectiveness of public training programs in Germany before the Hartz
reforms has been subject to a number of studies. For a recent review of the results
see Caliendo and Steiner (2005).3 The results are quite heterogeneous—depending
on the investigation period and the underlying data set. Recent studies which are
based on rich administrative data sets often ﬁnd at least for some sub-groups positive
treatment eﬀects (Lechner et al., 2005, 2007; Fitzenberger et al., 2008; Biewen et al.,
2007; Rinne et al., 2007). However, there are also recent studies ﬁnding insigniﬁcant
or negative eﬀects (Hujer et al., 2006; Lechner and Wunsch, 2008). Besides diﬀer-
ences in the investigation period and the underlying data set, the mixed results may
also be due to diﬀerent methodological approaches. For instance, Stephan (2009)
ﬁnds that estimated treatment eﬀects diﬀer considerably across diﬀerent deﬁnitions
of non-participants. Overall, the major lesson from the evaluation studies analyzing
the pre-reform period—i.e., before 2003—seems to be that positive eﬀects mainly
occur in the longer run, and that studies which ﬁnd positive medium- or long-term
eﬀects are also reporting negative short-term eﬀects.
Germany’s ALMP has undergone a series of reforms during the past years.
Figure 2 summarizes the most important legislative changes in this context. Al-
though these reforms are commonly referred to as the Hartz reforms, the ﬁrst eﬀort
was made when the JobAQTIVE Law came into force on January 1, 2002. Next
3The international literature on the evaluation of ALMP is summarized by LaLonde (2003) and
Kluve (2006), among others.
4to changes which aﬀected job placement procedures, registration standards and job
oﬀer requirements, this law also altered the rules for beneﬁt claims during and after
participation in public training programs.
Figure 2 about here
Major changes which aﬀected the provision of public training programs came
into force on January 1, 2003 under the ﬁrst two reform packages (Hartz I/II). Addi-
tional changes aﬀected temporary employment as Personal Service Agencies (PSA)
were introduced and moreover unemployment assistance levels were cut. Registra-
tion standards and job oﬀer requirements were altered (again), and the rules for
exclusion from beneﬁts were tightened. Finally, the legislation concerning marginal
employment was extended and a new start-up subsidy for the unemployed was in-
troduced.
The third package of Hartz reforms (Hartz III) came into force on January 1,
2004. Its main objective was a reorganization of the Federal Labor Agency. Addi-
tional changes aﬀected job creation schemes, the unemployment beneﬁt legislation,
and the rules for exclusion from beneﬁts. As a ﬁnal step of the series of reforms, the
fourth package (Hartz IV) was introduced in the beginning of 2005. Its most im-
portant feature constitutes the combination of the former systems of unemployment
assistance and social assistance into the new means-tested unemployment beneﬁt II
system. Besides that, One-Euro-Jobs were introduced. An overview of the impact
of the reform on ALMP is given for example by Jacobi and Kluve (2007). A broader
picture is provided by Ebbinghaus and Eichhorst (2009) who describe institutional
provisions and reforms of employment protection, active and passive labor market
policies in Germany between 1991 and 2005.
Prior to the Hartz I/II package, i.e., before 2003, the provision of public train-
ing programs in Germany was organized as follows. After consultation with the job
seeker, the caseworker in the local oﬃce of the FEA decided whether or not the
unemployed individual should receive training. Courses were operated by private
providers which were approved beforehand. The system is considered as a de facto
contracting-out, although there were no legal contracts between providers and local
FEA oﬃces. Legally, job seekers paid the courses and were reimbursed, but usually
the local oﬃces paid the course fees directly to the providers in order to facili-
tate administration. The degree of competition among providers was limited since
approvals were granted only to exactly the number of providers needed to meet
regional demand. A public tendering procedure was not in place. This informal
5procedure entailed a potential for collusive behavior between local FEA oﬃces and
private providers. For instance, there was an informal guarantee that the capacity
approved by the local oﬃce would be fully used. It was often reported that approved
courses were simply ﬁlled up, even though the training provided was inappropriate
for some individuals.
After January 1, 2003 the provision of public training programs substan-
tially changed. The most prominent feature of the reform marks the introduction
of the training voucher (Bildungsgutschein) which abandoned the former de facto
contracting-out system. A training voucher is granted if the caseworker considers
participation in a given type of public training program as a successful strategy to
reintegrate the job seeker in the primary labor market—without taking into account
the relative gain compared to the counterfactual situation without participation.
The selection criteria for participants thus became stricter after the reform; and
the matching between program types and participants by the caseworkers which is
also based on the expected reemployment probability is completely novel. As Fig-
ure 3 shows, the voucher—once it is granted—prescribes the program’s maximum
duration, its intended educational target, its geographical scope, and the maximum
course fee which will be reimbursed by the local FEA oﬃce. It is valid for at most
three months. Within this period, job seekers are completely free to chose among
approved training providers and courses in the market—subject to the requirements
stated in the voucher.4 Local FEA staﬀ are not allowed to make recommendations,
but can provide, e.g., a list of approved courses. There was, however, a transitional
arrangement when the reform was introduced: The allocation of participants into
public training programs was exclusively based on vouchers only from March 2003
onwards (Schneider et al., 2007).5
Figure 3 about here
Although the innovative voucher system should both increase consumer sov-
ereignty and competition among training providers, Bruttel (2005) presents initial
evidence that there are practical obstacles to fully achieve this positive eﬀects. For
instance, information asymmetries constrain consumer sovereignty. In particular
low-skilled job seekers lack the abilities to navigate the training market and to take
4The approval of providers and courses is subject to a new quality management system which
adopts a two-level approach. For details see, e.g., Bruttel (2005).
5The oﬃcial transitional arrangement was as follows: “Individuals who were counseled before
January 1, 2003 and participation in a public training program was agreed upon do not receive a
training voucher if they enter the program until February 28, 2003.”
6an active role in searching for an appropriate course. This argument is supported
by Kruppe (2008) who ﬁnds that low-skilled individuals are signiﬁcantly less likely
to redeem a granted voucher than persons with higher qualiﬁcations. However, the
overall redemption rate is comparatively high with 85 percent in the period from 2003
to 2006 (Kruppe, 2008). On the supply side, a potential obstacle for competition
among providers is their unequal distribution across German regions. Providers also
reacted to the reform and increased co-operation and collusive behavior, for example
by not oﬀering the same courses anymore.
This initial evidence is supplemented by Schneider et al. (2007) who analyze
the implementation of the reform as a whole. Accordingly, the impacts of the reform
primarily materialize in two dimensions. First, the composition of participants is
aﬀected. Participants in the post-reform period exhibit on average better employ-
ment prospects than in the pre-reform period. Second, the structure of program
types is aﬀected. The focus shifts towards regions with lower unemployment rates,
courses with comparatively shorter durations, and courses providing qualiﬁcations
and skills which ﬁt regional short-term market demand.
Given the practical obstacles and the actual implementation process, the over-
all impact of the reform on the eﬀectiveness of public training programs is anything
but clear. However, Schneider and Uhlendorﬀ (2006) and Schneider et al. (2007) ﬁnd
that the eﬀectiveness increases after the reform. Nonetheless, the question which
features of the reform cause this increase—and to what particular extent—remains
unanswered.
Compared to previous studies, the most signiﬁcant diﬀerence of our paper is
the decomposition of the overall reform eﬀect into a “selection eﬀect” and a “voucher
eﬀect”. We refer to the selection eﬀect as the eﬀect resulting from a diﬀerent compo-
sition of participants between the pre- and the post-reform period. This eﬀect is due
both to stricter selection criteria and to the unintended consequence of the voucher
that low-skilled job seekers lack the abilities to navigate the training market and to
take an active role in searching for an appropriate course. Low-skilled individuals
thus exhibit a lower voucher receipt rate (intended by the caseworkers) as well as a
lower voucher redemption rate (unintended). On the other hand, the voucher eﬀect
comprises the intended impacts of the introduction of training vouchers according to
our taxonomy. These consequences include a potentially better match between par-
ticipants and courses, an apparently more market-oriented (i.e., demand-oriented)
approach of the local FEA oﬃces, and quality enhancements which could be due to
increased competition among training providers.
7In order to isolate the above two eﬀects, and to avoid complications of other
components of Hartz III and IV reform discussed previously, we restrict our sample
to 2002 (pre-reform period) and 2003 (post-reform period).
3 Analytical Framework
In order to disentangle the eﬀects of the reform arising from a change of program
quality due to a better match between participants and providers and/or an im-
proved quality of the oﬀered training programs (voucher eﬀect) and the change of
the composition of participants (selection eﬀect), we apply a two-step matching
approach.
Using the potential outcome framework as in Neyman (1923), Roy (1951), or
Rubin (1974), we assume that each individual has two potential outcomes for the
program: Y1i is the outcome if individual i participates, and Y0i if not. Let Di be
an indicator for participation, we can deﬁne diﬀerent treatment eﬀects in a similar
way as Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005):
TEi = Y1i − Y0i (Treatment eﬀect for individual i)
ATE = E[TEi] (Average treatment eﬀect for the population)
ATT = E[TEi|Di = 1] (Average treatment eﬀect on the treated)
In this paper, we are interested in the treatment eﬀect on the treated and its change
induced by the reform. Ri is an indicator which takes on the value 0 if we observe
an individual before the reform and 1 if we observe an individual after the reform.
The average treatment eﬀects on the treated before and after the reform are given
by:
ATT b = E[TEi|Di = 1,Ri = 0] (ATT pre-reform period)
ATT p = E[TEi|Di = 1,Ri = 1] (ATT post-reform period)
A simple comparison of treated and non-treated individuals may be biased
if participants and non-participants diﬀer with respect to characteristics having an
impact on the outcome Y . If treatment assignment is strongly ignorable, i.e. if
selection is based on observable characteristics X (conditional independence) and if
observable characteristics of participants and non-participants overlap, the match-
ing approach is an appealing choice to estimate treatment eﬀects. Formally, these
8assumptions are given by:
(Y0i,Y1i) ⊥ Di|Xi (Conditional independence assumption)
0 < prob(Di = 1|Xi) < 1 (Overlap assumption)
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if the matching assumptions hold, i.e.,
treatment assignment is strongly ignorable given X, it is also strongly ignorable
given any balancing score that is a function of X.6 One possible balancing score is
the propensity score P(X), i.e., the probability of participating in a given program.
Mueser et al. (2007) present evidence that if rich administrative data is used to mea-
sure the performance of training programs, propensity score matching is generally
most eﬀective.
We thus estimate ATTb (ATTp) from pre-reform data (post-reform data) by
propensity score matching methods.7 However, the diﬀerence between ATTb and
ATTp does not equal the eﬀect of the introduction of vouchers, since the partic-
ipants before and after reform may have diﬀerent characteristics. As mentioned
above, compared to the pre-reform period, the post-reform programs are more se-
lective (possibly leading to a selection eﬀect, SE) and vouchers are introduced (which
may cause a voucher eﬀect, VE). If we assume additive separability of the two com-
ponents, ATTp is given by:
ATTp = ATTb + V E + SE (4)
and the overall reform eﬀect (RE) can be written as:
RE = ATTp − ATTb
= V E + SE
(5)
To isolate the voucher eﬀect, we apply a two-step propensity score matching
procedure. In the ﬁrst step, pre-reform participants are matched with post-reform
participants. As a result, the obtained pairs of participants only diﬀer with respect
to the timing of participation. Importantly, observable characteristics do not dif-
fer anymore. In the second step, the matched pre-reform participants in 2002 are
matched with non-participants of the same year. The corresponding treatment eﬀect
6When there are many covariates, it is impractical to match directly on covariates because of
the curse of dimensionality. See, e.g., Zhao (2008) for some comments on this problem.
7Heckman et al. (1997, 1998) present a weaker version of the conditional independence assump-
tion: E[Y0i|Di = 0,Xi] = E[Y0i|Di = 1,Xi].
9ATTbp is the eﬀect only for those participants under the pre-reform regime who are
comparable to participants after the reform. This step controls for the changes in
the composition of participants before and after the reform, i.e., the selection eﬀect.
With ATTbp we can calculate the diﬀerence in diﬀerences of the treatment
eﬀects to estimate the voucher eﬀect:
V E = ATTp − ATTbp (6)
Finally, the comparison of the voucher eﬀect with the reform eﬀect gives us an
estimate of the selection eﬀect:
SE = RE − V E
= (ATTp − ATTb) − (ATTp − ATTbp)
= ATTbp − ATTb
(7)
There are several propensity score matching methods suggested in the lit-
erature, see, e.g., Imbens (2004), Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) and Imbens and
Wooldridge (2008) for overviews. Based on the characteristics of our data and
particularly because of the two-step matching approach which is pursued, we opt
for nearest-neighbor matching without replacement. This matching method has
the advantage of being the most straightforward matching estimator: a given par-
ticipant is matched with a non-participant or participant who is closest in terms
of the estimated propensity score. We avoid an increased variance of the estima-
tor as we match without replacement (Smith and Todd, 2005a), which is justiﬁed
since the ratio between participants and (non-)participants—i.e., potential matching
partners—is comparatively high in our data. Hence, the constructed counterfactual
outcome is based only on distinct (non-)participants.
More speciﬁcally, the probability of participation is estimated conditional on
a number of observable characteristics using binary probit models with participa-
tion as the dependent variable.8 These characteristics include socio-demographic-
characteristics (e.g., age, nationality, marital status), regional information (region,
unemployment rate), educational and vocational attainment, the employment his-
tory (four years prior to program entry), and information on the last employment
8The matching algorithms are implemented using the PSMATCH2 Stata ado-package by Leuven
and Sianesi (2003).
10spell (duration, income, business sector).9 We run these regressions separately for
women and men from East and West Germany, respectively. After estimating the
propensity score, we ﬁnd a suitable matching partner by exact covariate matching
combined with propensity score matching. The variables used for exact matching are
region, previous unemployment duration (in months), and quarter of program entry.
Therefore, we stratify the four sub-samples of women and men in East and West
Germany by these variables ﬁrst, and then implement propensity score matching
for each cell without replacement. This procedure ensures that matched partici-
pants and non-participants are a) previously unemployed for the same duration at
program entry, and b) entering the program in the same quarter. The latter con-
dition makes sure that seasonal inﬂuences are constant. Furthermore, we do not
condition on future non-partition. This is important in the context of dynamic
assignment processes. Following the argumentation of Sianesi (2004), in countries
like Sweden or Germany in principle any unemployed individual will join a program
at some time, provided he remains unemployed long enough. Hence, a restriction
on future outcomes—i.e., to require non-participation in the follow-up period after
the ﬁctitious program entry—is supposed to eﬀect estimated treatment eﬀects neg-
atively, since a substantial fraction of the ‘never treated’-individuals would de facto
be observed to leave the unemployment register.
In order to assess the impact of the reform on the employment probability and
earnings of participants, we estimate linear probability and ordinary least squares
models. To test the robustness of our results with respect to potential diﬀerences
in observable characteristics X, which may remain after the matching, we run ad-
ditional regressions controlling for observable characteristics X.10
These additional regressions also allow us to control for changes in the general
economic situation and changes in the extent and the composition of ALMP; these
changes may be additional components of the reform eﬀect.11 Although we generally
argue that we control for such changes as participants and matched non-participants
are subject to the same environment, we will explicitly address this issue in our
sensitivity analyses and control for potential changes in our regressions.
For the variance of the estimated treatment eﬀects, we base our inference on
9Selected variables are listed in Table 1. The exact speciﬁcations and a list of all variables are
not reported here, but available upon request.
10This procedure can correct a possible remaining bias as discussed in Rubin (1973), Imbens
(2004), and Abadie and Imbens (2002).
11For instance, Lechner and Wunsch (2006) present evidence for a clear positive relation between
the eﬀectiveness of the programs and the unemployment rate over time.
11bootstrapping procedures. More speciﬁcally, we bootstrap the whole estimation pro-
cess. This allows us to calculate standard errors based on the distribution of the
estimated treatment eﬀects. The standard errors of the reform eﬀect, the voucher ef-
fect and the selection eﬀect are based on the distribution of the respective diﬀerences
in treatment eﬀects across the replications.
4 Data
We use a sample of a particularly rich administrative data set, the Integrated Em-
ployment Biographies (IEB) of the FEA.12 It contains detailed daily information
on employment subject to social security contribution including occupational and
sectoral information, receipt of transfer payments during periods of unemployment,
and participation in diﬀerent programs of ALMP. Furthermore, the IEB comprises a
large variety of covariates—e.g., age, marital status, number of dependent children,
disability, nationality and education.
In Germany, public training programs for the unemployed are quite heteroge-
nous. Thus, we concentrate on the most important program type: occupation-
related or general training. Participants either learn speciﬁc skills required for a
certain vocation (e.g., computer-aided design for a technician/tracer) or receive qual-
iﬁcations that are of general vocational use (e.g., MS Oﬃce, computer skills). The
program does not aim to provide a certiﬁcate, i.e., an oﬃcially recognized voca-
tional degree. In contrast to other program types it focuses on classroom training
and is neither provided in combination with internships nor is the simulation of real
operations conducted. In the pre-reform period about 60 percent of all participants
in public training programs were assigned to this particular type, and it became
even more important after the reform in 2003 as this share increased to more than
70 percent. Figure 4 indicates that the program is—in comparison to other ALMP
measures in Germany—a rather short measure. Both in the pre-reform and in the
post-reform period, after one year more than 90 percent of the participants have ex-
ited from the program. However, the program duration decreased after the reform.
While the median program duration is about 8 months in the pre-reform period, it
amounts to about 6 months after the reform.
12The IEB combines four diﬀerent administrative data sources: the employees’ history (BeH),
the beneﬁt recipients’ history (LeH), the job seekers’ data base (ASU/BewA), and the program
participants’ master data set (MTH). However, it is in general not publicly available. Only a 2.2
percent random sample (the Integrated Employment Biographies Sample, IEBS) can be obtained
for research purposes. See, e.g., Jacobebbinghaus and Seth (2007) for details on the IEBS.
12Figure 4 about here
To evaluate the impact of the reform and its features on the eﬀectiveness
of this type of public training program, our data includes participants as well as
non-participants from the pre- and post-reform period, respectively. More specif-
ically, we have information on: a) participants who entered the program in 2002,
b) participants who entered the program in 2003, c) non-participants in 2002, and
d) non-participants in 2003. We do not have information on individuals who re-
ceived a voucher but did not make use of it. Our sample of participants who entered
the program in 2003 consists of more than 1,200 individuals. In order to apply the
matching approach as described above (see Section 3) roughly 20 participants from
the period before the reform were drawn per participant in 2003. Therefore, we have
information on about 23,000 participants who entered the program in 2002. Beyond
the matching of post-reform participants with pre-reform participants, we need to
match participants with non-participants. For both years (2002 and 2003) our sam-
ple of non-participants—i.e., potential controls—consists of more than 500,000 indi-
viduals. Non-participants are required to not having participated in the given type
of training before and in the quarter of the participant’s program entry, but we do
not condition on future non-participation.
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of selected variables for the samples of
participants and non-participants in 2002 and 2003, respectively. Focusing ﬁrstly on
individuals participating in training, we ﬁnd evidence for a change in their composi-
tion between the pre- and the post-reform period in our data. The most remarkable
change can be observed with respect to the previous employment histories which dif-
fer considerably between these two groups. Considering a period of four years prior
to program entry, participants who entered after the reform show a higher labor
market attachment in terms of un-/employment rates and a slightly higher income
from last employment than earlier program entrants. The average age of a partic-
ipant also dropped by more than one year, while other characteristics remain on
average rather stable between the two years. In particular, diﬀerences with respect
to the educational or vocational attainment do not appear to be substantial. On
the other hand, the groups of non-participants are very diﬀerent from the groups of
participants in both years. They are on average older and less educated. Moreover,
their employment histories reveal a higher incidence of unemployment as well as a
lower incidence of employment relative to participants in training.
Table 1 about here
13The success of program participation is evaluated by looking at a) the proba-
bility of being employed, and b) earnings. Our observation period—i.e., the period
in which outcomes are observed—starts at program entry and it ranges over a period
of 18 months. This period is based on the fact that we focus on program participa-
tion in the years 2002 and 2003, and we can observe reliable data for all employment
states until December 31, 2004. Individuals are regarded as employed if they hold a
job in the primary labor market. For instance, participation in job creation schemes
is not included in this outcome measure. Moreover, the administrative data set
only includes employment that is subject to social security contributions.13 Ad-
ditionally, we evaluate the eﬀect of program participation on monthly earnings in
the primary labor market. We apply the described deﬁnition of employment and
consider remunerations associated with these spells in terms of monthly earnings.
In order to control for changes in the general economic situation which may
constitute another component of the reform eﬀect, we consider a number of economic
and labor market characteristics available for each labor market district. We use
monthly information on the share of unemployed, the share of vacancies, the share
of participants in various ALMP measures (including public training programs) as
well as GDP growth rates.14 Table A1 in the Appendix reports the change of these
variables between 2002 and 2004. For example, the unemployment rate slightly
increased on average from around 10 percent in 2002 to around 10.7 percent in
2004, while the share of unemployed individuals participating in training programs
decreased during this period.
Furthermore, the implementation of the reform may have varied across local
FEA districts. We address this issue by using information about the subjective
judgement of the Hartz reforms obtained through a survey conducted in the begin-
ning of 2005 in the management departments of the local FEA districts. They are
asked about the change of the job placement, the beneﬁt granting, the administrative
eﬀort and the co-operation with third parties like training providers and employers,
and the subjective judgment is on average rather positive. However, we observe
heterogeneity in the judgements, and we will control for this in our regressions. The
included items are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix.
13This means that, e.g., we do not observe self-employment.
14We include annual GDP growth rates for the 16 federal states since more disaggregated data
is not available.
145 Matching Quality
We apply diﬀerent strategies to evaluate the balancing of observable characteristics
between the diﬀerent groups after the matching.
One way to assess the matching quality is to compare the standardized bias
before matching, SBb, to the standardized bias after matching, SBa. The standard-










0.5 · (V1M(X) + V0M(X))
, (8)
where X1 (V1) is the mean (variance) in the treated group before matching and
X0 (V0) the analogue for the comparison group. X1M (V1M) and X0M (V0M) are
the corresponding values after matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). The mean
standardized bias should be reduced after matching.
Following the suggestion of Sianesi (2004) we also re-estimate the propensity
score on the matched sample to compute the pseudo-R2 before and after match-
ing. The pseudo-R2 indicates how well the observable characteristics X explain the
probability of being treated. After the matching the pseudo-R2 should be low be-
cause there should be no systematic diﬀerences between the treated and not treated
individuals.
In a third approach we test the balancing following a suggestion by Smith and
Todd (2005b) and estimate the following regression for each observable characteristic
x included in our preferred speciﬁcation:
xk = β0 + β1 \ PS(X) + β2 \ PS(X)
2
+ β3 \ PS(X)
3
+ α0D + α1D \ PS(X) + α2D \ PS(X)
2




D is the treatment indicator, \ PS(X) the estimated propensity score, and xk is the
observable characteristic k. For each x we perform an F-test of the joint null hy-
pothesis that all coeﬃcients on terms involving D equal zero. If the balancing score
satisﬁes the balancing condition, D should not provide any information about xk.
Table 2 summarizes the results from the three balancing tests. We tested the
balancing for diﬀerent sub-samples: women and men in East and West Germany,
respectively. Altogether, we perform ﬁve matching procedures: a) pre-reform par-
ticipants are matched with post-reform participants, b) unmatched pre-reform par-
ticipants are matched with pre-reform non-participants, c) unmatched post-reform
15participants are matched with post-reform non-participants, d) matched pre-reform
participants are matched with pre-reform non-participants, and e) matched post-
reform participants are matched with post-reform non-participants. Unmatched and
matched participants may diﬀer because we do not ﬁnd for every participant after
the reform a suitable match from the period before the reform, i.e., the matched par-
ticipants are a subset of the unmatched participants. Overall, the balancing of the
diﬀerent matching procedures is quite satisfactory: the percentage biases are appar-
ently reduced. More speciﬁcally, mean standardized biases in the matched samples
are—with one exception—noticeably smaller than in the unmatched samples and
are are mostly below ﬁve percent after matching. Likewise, the pseudo-R2 after
matching are fairly low and decrease substantially compared to before matching.
Moreover, in most of the matching procedures our third test indicates that D does
not provide any information about any observable characteristics. However, some
of our matching procedures perform better than others. We get the worst perfor-
mance for our matching of participants before the reform with participants after the
reform, especially for females in East Germany—although the third test indicates
no problems for the participant-participant matching for any of our sub-samples.
Therefore, we will check the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of observable
characteristics in our regressions based on the matched samples, and we have to be
careful in the interpretation of our results for females in East Germany.
Table 2 about here
As an additional check of the matching quality, we plot the fraction of indi-
viduals being employed in the primary labor market before and after matching for
a period of four years prior to participation. This approach follows, e.g., Heckman
and Hotz (1989) and Mueser et al. (2007). Figures 5 and 6 display that the one-
step as well as the two-step matching procedures generate comparison groups with
employment probabilities prior to participation which are pretty close to those of
the treatment groups. Although they are still not identical, the substantial diﬀer-
ences before matching disappear across all matched samples. Moreover, Figure 6(a)
points out very clearly that—before matching—participants after the reform have
more favorable employment histories than participants before the reform.
Figures 5 and 6 about here
166 Results
In this section, we present the eﬀects on diﬀerent outcomes for a period of 1.5 years
after program entry. First, we compare the employment probabilities. Second, we
present results for the eﬀects on earnings, and ﬁnally we conduct several sensitivity
analyses.
6.1 Employment Probabilities
The estimates of the average treatment eﬀects on employment probabilities of the
participants are reported in Figure 7. We observe that participants before and after
the reform face a substantial lock-in eﬀect, both treatment eﬀects are signiﬁcantly
negative in the ﬁrst months.15 After around 6 months of training, both treatment
eﬀects diverge and the treatment eﬀect for participants after the reform constantly
lies above the treatment for participants before the reform. At the end of our
observation period, i.e., 1.5 years after program entry, the point estimates of the
treatment eﬀects amount to about 3 percentage points before the reform and about
7 percentage points after the reform.
Figure 7 about here
The diﬀerences between these two treatment eﬀects describes the reform eﬀect.
We thus ﬁnd a positive impact of the reform, which may occur due to the voucher
eﬀect or due to the change in the composition of participants. Figure 8 displays the
decomposition of the reform eﬀect and reveals insights about the extent and mag-
nitude of reform eﬀect, voucher eﬀect, and selection eﬀect. The upper part reports
the point estimates of the three eﬀects, while the eﬀects including the corresponding
conﬁdence intervals are reported separately in the lower part.
Figure 8 about here
The decomposition shows that the positive reform eﬀect seems to be almost
exclusively based on the voucher eﬀect. Similar to the reform eﬀect, the voucher
eﬀect becomes substantially positive after around 6 months. The voucher eﬀect
is signiﬁcantly positive from month 7 until month 13 after entering the program.
15While participating—or being ‘locked-in’ in the program—individuals probably reduce their
search activities for new jobs (van Ours, 2004).
17However, for the last 5 months of our observation period, the eﬀect is still positive,
but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The point estimates of the selection eﬀect are almost always negative, but
never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This indicates that there is no evidence for
a positive impact of a stricter selection of participants on the average treatment
eﬀect. In contrast to that, our results—if at all—seem to indicate that the overall
reform eﬀect would have been more positive if the composition of participants had
not changed. Our ﬁnding is consistent with Lechner and Smith (2007) who present
evidence that caseworkers are not the best choice to allocate unemployed individuals
into programs. Although their results are based on Swiss data, the situation in which
caseworkers select the training providers and programs on behalf of the unemployed
precisely describes the pre-reform situation in Germany. This changed under the
new regime; and after the reform job seekers are free to choose their provider on
their own by means of training vouchers.
Additionally, we estimate the corresponding eﬀects for four subgroups sepa-
rately: men and women in West and East Germany, respectively. The results are
reported in the Appendix, Figures A1–A16. We ﬁnd some evidence for heterogeneity
of the eﬀects, but the general picture is similar. We ﬁnd rather negative and never
signiﬁcant selection eﬀects and rather positive voucher eﬀects. The voucher eﬀect
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero only for men in East Germany. However, because
the number of observations clearly drops if we analyze the eﬀects separately for the
four subgroups, these results have to be interpreted with caution.
6.2 Earnings
Corresponding to the eﬀects on employment probabilities, we present the average
treatments eﬀects on monthly earnings before and after the reform in Figure 9.
Again, we observe substantial lock-in eﬀects for both periods and clearly higher
point estimates for the post-reform period after around 6 months of treatment.
18 months after entering the program, the point estimates of the treatment eﬀects
are about e 40 and roughly e 150 per month in the pre- and post-reform period,
respectively.
Figure 9 about here
Figure 10 displays the decomposition of the reform eﬀect. Similar to the em-
ployment probabilities, the positive reform eﬀect seems to be almost exclusively
18based on the voucher eﬀect. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant impact of the selection eﬀect
and a positive impact of the voucher eﬀect, although not always signiﬁcant. The
similarity to the employment probabilities is not surprising, because the positive
earnings eﬀects reﬂect at least partly the increased employment probabilities.
Figure 10 about here
In order to get additional insights in the eﬀects on earnings, we estimate the
treatment eﬀects using realized earnings only, i.e., we compare earnings conditional
on being employed. The results are reported in Figures 11 and 12.
Figures 11 and 12 about here
The point estimates of the voucher eﬀect are always positive, and the selection
eﬀect is always negative. Both eﬀects are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, but
the voucher eﬀect steadily increases during the observation period. Altogether, this
indicates that the introduction of the voucher—next to an increased employment
probability—also leads to better job matches for the participants, measured by on
average higher monthly earnings in the new job.
6.3 Sensitivity Analysis
We address the robustness of our previous results in this section. For this purpose,
we perform a sensitivity analysis in two steps. We assess the robustness of our
results with respect to a) the inclusion of additional control variables, and b) the
transitional arrangement for the training voucher in the beginning of 2003.
Inclusion of additional control variables
One may argue that changes in the general economic situation constitute another
component of the reform eﬀect. Therefore, we additionally control for a number of
economic and labor market characteristics which are available for each local FEA
district. These variables are changing over time. In addition to that, we include
observable individual characteristics measured before entering the treatment and
include—only for the post-reform period—indicators describing the implementation
of the Hartz reform on the FEA district level.
The results are presented in Figures 13 and 14. In general, the picture is very
similar to the results presented above. The point estimates of the voucher eﬀect
19are slightly lowered, while the selection eﬀect is slightly less negative. However,
the voucher eﬀect is still signiﬁcantly positive between month 7 and month 13 after
entering the program, and the selection eﬀect is still almost always negative.
Figures 13 and 14 about here
The results are also very similar for earnings, as reported in Figures 15 and 16.
The voucher eﬀect marginally lowers and selection aﬀect slightly increases. Our
results thus appear to be robust to the inclusion of additional control variables.
Figures 15 and 16 about here
Transitional Arrangement
We mentioned above that there has been a transitional arrangement in place until
March 2003 (see Section 2). Unfortunately, the administrative data set does not
allow us to identify those participants who actually received and redeemed a train-
ing voucher. We thus perform a sensitivity analysis and exclude participants who
entered public training programs in the ﬁrst quarter of 2003.16 The results of this
analysis are depicted in Figures 17 and 18.
Figures 17 and 18 about here
Also after taking account of the transitional arrangement in the beginning of
2003, we still observe the main result of a positive impact of the voucher. The
selection eﬀect is virtually zero. However, at the end of the observation period we
estimate both voucher and selection eﬀect to be positive, although not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. The results are again very similar for earnings, as reported in
Figures 19 and 20.
Figures 19 and 20 about here
16According to Schneider et al. (2007) who analyze survey data, the fraction of participants in
public training programs actually receiving a voucher was about 30 percent in the ﬁrst quarter
of 2003, but sharply increased subsequently. Of course excluding participants who entered public
training programs in the ﬁrst quarter of 2003 implies that we also exclude participants who entered
public training programs in the ﬁrst quarter of 2002 as well as corresponding non-participants based
on our matching algorithm.
207 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the impact of the labor market reform in 2003 on the eﬀec-
tiveness of the most important type of public training program in Germany. This
reform had two main features: a) it introduced training vouchers, and b) it imposed
more selective criteria on participants. Next to estimating the overall impact, we
decompose the reform eﬀect into a) the voucher eﬀect, and b) the selection eﬀect.
Our results conﬁrm previous ﬁndings that the reform slightly increased the ef-
fectiveness of public training programs in Germany. The decomposition shows that
the positive reform eﬀect seems to be almost exclusively based on the voucher ef-
fect. The selection eﬀect is—if at all—slightly negative, although never signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. This indicates that there is no evidence for a positive impact
of a stricter selection of participants on the average treatment eﬀect. In contrast
to that, our results seem to indicate that the overall reform eﬀect would have been
even more positive if the composition of participants had not changed.
Our results moreover indicate that the introduction of the voucher—next to
an increased employment probability—also leads to better job matches for the par-
ticipants, measured by on average higher monthly earnings in the new job.
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January 1, 2002: JobAQTIVE Law
Þ Training: changes in beneﬁt claims during and after participation
Þ Job placement: proﬁling, aptitude tests, assignment of third parties
Þ Compulsory registration for those threatened with unemployment
Þ Changes in reasonability of job oﬀers
January 1, 2003: Hartz I/II
Þ Training: introduction of voucher, stricter selection criteria
Þ Temporary employment: Personal Service Agency (PSA)
Þ Cut in unemployment assistance
Þ Compulsory registration as job seeker at the time of layoﬀ notiﬁcation
Þ Further changes in reasonability of job oﬀers
Þ Tightening of rules for exclusion from beneﬁts
Þ Extension of marginal employment legislation, start-up subsidies
January 1, 2004: Hartz III
Þ Reorganization of the Federal Labor Agency
Þ Legislative changes concerning job creation schemes (ABM/SAM)
Þ Alteration of unemployment beneﬁt legislation
Þ Further tightening of rules for exclusion from beneﬁts
January 1, 2005: Hartz IV
Þ Combination of unemployment assistance and social assistance
to unemployment beneﬁts II (means-tested)
Þ Introduction of One-Euro-Jobs
Source: Authors’ illustration.
27Figure 3: Training Voucher
Training Voucher Number.: ________/____ 
Customer Number: ____________ 





Costs are covered 
  o  according to the certification procedure (lump-sum) 
  o  according to actual costs (as evidence is provided) 
 
Maximum duration:  up to ____ months (including an internship if necessary) 
 




Type of course:  o  full-time (35 hours/week)  o  part-time (12–24 hours/week) 
  o  on-the-job course  o  correspondence course 
 
Provider:  o  in-firm training  o  off-the-job training 
 
Location:  o  outside a daily commuting distance 
Source: Authors’ illustration.
Figure 4: Actual program duration
Source: IEB, own calculations.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 2: Matching quality
Sex Region Before Matching After Matching
Mean bias R2 Mean bias R2 # sign.
a) Two-step matching: Participants 2002 – Participants 2003
Female East Germany 8.359 0.2001 8.652 0.1329 0
Female West Germany 10.211 0.2125 6.760 0.1054 0
Male East Germany 7.493 0.0990 5.135 0.0595 0
Male West Germany 8.184 0.1158 5.972 0.0769 0
b) One-step matching: Participants 2002 – Non-participants 2002
Female East Germany 11.621 0.0536 1.059 0.0017 4
Female West Germany 11.991 0.0693 0.982 0.0013 2
Male East Germany 11.730 0.0562 1.050 0.0015 0
Male West Germany 11.725 0.0584 0.895 0.0009 0
c) One-step matching: Participants 2003 – Non-participants 2003
Female East Germany 13.461 0.0486 4.329 0.0337 0
Female West Germany 15.383 0.0558 3.714 0.0278 0
Male East Germany 14.231 0.0535 4.064 0.0271 1
Male West Germany 13.358 0.0480 2.241 0.0106 0
d) Two-step matching: Matched Participants 2002 – Non-participants 2002
Female East Germany 24.504 0.1092 5.811 0.0385 0
Female West Germany 25.836 0.1068 3.402 0.0247 0
Male East Germany 20.709 0.0881 2.969 0.0214 0
Male West Germany 22.185 0.0724 2.629 0.0204 0
e) Two-step matching: Matched Participants 2003 – Non-participants 2003
Female East Germany 21.841 0.0859 3.924 0.0333 0
Female West Germany 23.526 0.0946 2.581 0.0121 0
Male East Germany 18.842 0.0664 2.916 0.0219 0
Male West Germany 18.242 0.0714 2.329 0.0151 0
Notes: Mean Bias: Mean standardized bias; R2: Pseudo-R2 of propensity score estimation; # sign.: number
observable characteristics for which F-test rejects the joint null. Further details are given in the text.
30Figure 5: Pre-entry employment shares: one-step matching procedure
(a) unmatched P 2002 – unmatched NP 2002 (b) matched P 2002 – matched NP 2002
(c) unmatched P 2003 – unmatched NP 2003 (d) matched P 2003 – matched NP 2003
Notes: P: participants (in black); NP: non-participants (in gray).
31Figure 6: Pre-entry employment shares: two-step matching procedure
(a) unmatched P 2002 – unmatched P 2003 (b) matched P 2002 – matched P 2003
(c) matched P 2002 – unmatched NP 2002 (d) matched P 2002 – matched NP 2002
(e) matched P 2003 – unmatched NP 2003 (f) matched P 2003 – matched NP 2003
Notes: P: participants (in black); NP: non-participants (in gray). Matching between participants 2002 and
participants 2003: pre-reform participants in gray, post-reform participants in black.
32Figure 7: Reform eﬀect, employment
Note: Pre-reform period in black, post-reform period in gray. Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines
indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
Figure 8: Decomposition, employment
(a) Decomposition
(b) Reform eﬀect (c) Voucher eﬀect (d) Selection eﬀect
Note: Total reform eﬀect (RE) in black (solid), voucher eﬀect (VE) in black (dashed), and selection eﬀect (SE)
in gray (dashed). Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
33Figure 9: Reform eﬀect, earnings (deﬁnition A)
Deﬁnition A: Monthly earnings where no earnings are treated as zero.
Note: Pre-reform period in black, post-reform period in gray. Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines
indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
Figure 10: Decomposition, earnings (deﬁnition A)
(a) Decomposition
(b) Reform eﬀect (c) Voucher eﬀect (d) Selection eﬀect
Deﬁnition A: Monthly earnings where no earnings are treated as zero.
Note: Total reform eﬀect in black (solid), voucher eﬀect in black (dashed), and selection eﬀect in gray (dashed).
Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
34Figure 11: Reform eﬀect, earnings (deﬁnition B)
Deﬁnition B: Monthly earnings where no earnings are treated as missing.
Note: Pre-reform period in black, post-reform period in gray. Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines
indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
Figure 12: Decomposition, earnings (deﬁnition B)
(a) Decomposition
(b) Reform eﬀect (c) Voucher eﬀect (d) Selection eﬀect
Deﬁnition B: Monthly earnings where no earnings are treated as missing.
Note: Reform eﬀect in black (solid), voucher eﬀect in black (dashed), and selection eﬀect in gray (dashed).
Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
35Figure 13: Reform eﬀect, employment (including additional control variables)
Note: Pre-reform period in black, post-reform period in gray. Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines
indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
Figure 14: Decomposition, employment (including additional control variables)
(a) Decomposition
(b) Reform eﬀect (c) Voucher eﬀect (d) Selection eﬀect
Note: Total reform eﬀect (RE) in black (solid), voucher eﬀect (VE) in black (dashed), and selection eﬀect (SE)
in gray (dashed). Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
36Figure 15: Reform eﬀect, earnings (deﬁnition A, including additional control vari-
ables)
Deﬁnition A: Monthly earnings where no earnings are treated as zero.
Note: Pre-reform period in black, post-reform period in gray. Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines
indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
Figure 16: Decomposition, earnings (deﬁnition A, including additional control vari-
ables)
(a) Decomposition
(b) Reform eﬀect (c) Voucher eﬀect (d) Selection eﬀect
Deﬁnition A: Monthly earnings where no earnings are treated as zero.
Note: Total reform eﬀect in black (solid), voucher eﬀect in black (dashed), and selection eﬀect in gray (dashed).
Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
37Figure 17: Reform eﬀect, employment (excluding ﬁrst quarter, including additional
control variables)
Note: Pre-reform period in black, post-reform period in gray. Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines
indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
Figure 18: Decomposition, employment (excluding ﬁrst quarter, including additional
control variables)
(a) Decomposition
(b) Reform eﬀect (c) Voucher eﬀect (d) Selection eﬀect
Note: Total reform eﬀect (RE) in black (solid), voucher eﬀect (VE) in black (dashed), and selection eﬀect (SE)
in gray (dashed). Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
38Figure 19: Reform eﬀect, earnings (excluding ﬁrst quarter, deﬁnition A, including
additional control variables)
Deﬁnition A: Monthly earnings where no earnings are treated as zero.
Note: Pre-reform period in black, post-reform period in gray. Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines
indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
Figure 20: Decomposition, earnings (excluding ﬁrst quarter, deﬁnition A, including
additional control variables)
(a) Decomposition
(b) Reform eﬀect (c) Voucher eﬀect (d) Selection eﬀect
Deﬁnition A: Monthly earnings where no earnings are treated as zero.
Note: Total reform eﬀect in black (solid), voucher eﬀect in black (dashed), and selection eﬀect in gray (dashed).
Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
39Appendix
Table A1: Economic and labor market variables
2002 2003 2004
Mean Mean Mean
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.)















6) Job creation schemes 0.0050 0.0037 0.0029
(0.0076) (0.0059) (0.0047)
7) GDP growth rate
1.5191 1.0258 2.2837
(1.3170) (0.6455) (0.7575)
Source: Federal Employment Agency (FEA); Statistical Oﬃces of the Federal States.
Notes: 1)–6) are monthly shares in the civilian labor force in 178 FEA districts. 7) are annual GDP growth
rates for the 16 Federal States.
Table A2: Rating of the Hartz reforms by FEA districts
How did the reforms negative neutral positive missing
aﬀect the ... –2 –1 0 +1 +2 .
...eﬀectiveness of job placement 1 8 81 66 3 4
0.6 4.9 49.7 40.5 1.8 2.5
...process of job placement 1 9 61 82 6 4
0.6 5.5 37.4 50.3 3.7 2.5
...eﬃciency of job placement 1 7 64 83 5 3
0.6 4.3 39.3 50.9 3.1 1.8
...process of beneﬁt granting 2 14 67 64 13 3
1.2 8.6 41.1 39.3 8.0 1.8
...co-operation with third parties 2 34 108 15 1 3
1.2 20.9 66.3 9.2 0.6 1.8
...administration eﬀort 23 60 56 18 1 5
14.1 36.8 34.4 11.0 0.6 3.1
...matching accuracy of job placement 1 6 71 75 6 4
0.6 3.7 43.6 46.0 3.7 2.5
Source: Survey in 163 FEA districts conducted in the beginning of 2005.
Notes: First row: frequencies; second row: percentages.
40Figure A1: Reform eﬀect, West German Men, employment
Note: Pre-reform period in black, post-reform period in gray. Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines
indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
Figure A2: Decomposition, West German Men, employment
(a) Decomposition
(b) Reform eﬀect (c) Voucher eﬀect (d) Selection eﬀect
Note: Total reform eﬀect (RE) in black (solid), voucher eﬀect (VE) in black (dashed), and selection eﬀect (SE)
in gray (dashed). Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
41Figure A3: Reform eﬀect, West German Men, earnings (deﬁnition A)
Deﬁnition A: Monthly earnings where no earnings are treated as zero.
Note: Pre-reform period in black, post-reform period in gray. Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines
indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
Figure A4: Decomposition, West German Men, earnings (deﬁnition A)
(a) Decomposition
(b) Reform eﬀect (c) Voucher eﬀect (d) Selection eﬀect
Deﬁnition A: Monthly earnings where no earnings are treated as zero.
Note: Total reform eﬀect (RE) in black (solid), voucher eﬀect (VE) in black (dashed), and selection eﬀect (SE)
in gray (dashed). Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
42Figure A5: Reform eﬀect, West German Women, employment
Note: Pre-reform period in black, post-reform period in gray. Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines
indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
Figure A6: Decomposition, West German Women, employment
(a) Decomposition
(b) Reform eﬀect (c) Voucher eﬀect (d) Selection eﬀect
Note: Total reform eﬀect (RE) in black (solid), voucher eﬀect (VE) in black (dashed), and selection eﬀect (SE)
in gray (dashed). Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
43Figure A7: Reform eﬀect, West German Women, earnings (deﬁnition A)
Deﬁnition A: Monthly earnings where no earnings are treated as zero.
Note: Pre-reform period in black, post-reform period in gray. Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines
indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
Figure A8: Decomposition, West German Women, earnings (deﬁnition A)
(a) Decomposition
(b) Reform eﬀect (c) Voucher eﬀect (d) Selection eﬀect
Deﬁnition A: Monthly earnings where no earnings are treated as zero.
Note: Total reform eﬀect (RE) in black (solid), voucher eﬀect (VE) in black (dashed), and selection eﬀect (SE)
in gray (dashed). Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
44Figure A9: Reform eﬀect, East German Men, employment
Note: Pre-reform period in black, post-reform period in gray. Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines
indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
Figure A10: Decomposition, East German Men, employment
(a) Decomposition
(b) Reform eﬀect (c) Voucher eﬀect (d) Selection eﬀect
Note: Total reform eﬀect (RE) in black (solid), voucher eﬀect (VE) in black (dashed), and selection eﬀect (SE)
in gray (dashed). Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
45Figure A11: Reform eﬀect, East German Men, earnings (deﬁnition A)
Deﬁnition A: Monthly earnings where no earnings are treated as zero.
Note: Pre-reform period in black, post-reform period in gray. Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines
indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
Figure A12: Decomposition, East German Men, earnings (deﬁnition A)
(a) Decomposition
(b) Reform eﬀect (c) Voucher eﬀect (d) Selection eﬀect
Deﬁnition A: Monthly earnings where no earnings are treated as zero.
Note: Total reform eﬀect (RE) in black (solid), voucher eﬀect (VE) in black (dashed), and selection eﬀect (SE)
in gray (dashed). Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
46Figure A13: Reform eﬀect, East German Women, employment
Note: Pre-reform period in black, post-reform period in gray. Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines
indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
Figure A14: Decomposition, East German Women, employment
(a) Decomposition
(b) Reform eﬀect (c) Voucher eﬀect (d) Selection eﬀect
Note: Total reform eﬀect (RE) in black (solid), voucher eﬀect (VE) in black (dashed), and selection eﬀect (SE)
in gray (dashed). Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
47Figure A15: Reform eﬀect, East German Women, earnings (deﬁnition A)
Deﬁnition A: Monthly earnings where no earnings are treated as zero.
Note: Pre-reform period in black, post-reform period in gray. Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines
indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
Figure A16: Decomposition, East German Women, earnings (deﬁnition A)
(a) Decomposition
(b) Reform eﬀect (c) Voucher eﬀect (d) Selection eﬀect
Deﬁnition A: Monthly earnings where no earnings are treated as zero.
Note: Total reform eﬀect (RE) in black (solid), voucher eﬀect (VE) in black (dashed), and selection eﬀect (SE)
in gray (dashed). Thick lines refer to point estimates, thin lines indicate 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
48